In fair division, equitability dictates that each participant receives the same level of utility. In this work, we study equitable allocations of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. While prior work has studied (approximate) equitability in isolation, we consider equitability in conjunction with other well-studied notions of fairness and economic e ciency. We show that the Leximin algorithm produces an allocation that satis es equitability up to any good and Pareto optimality. We also give a novel algorithm that guarantees Pareto optimality and equitability up to one good in pseudopolynomial time. Our experiments on real-world preference data reveal that approximate envy-freeness, approximate equitability, and Pareto optimality can often be achieved simultaneously.
Introduction
We consider fair division problems that require a central planner to divide a set of goods among a group of agents-each with their own individual preferences over the goods-such that the resulting allocation is fair. How exactly one can certify that an allocation is "fair" remains a subject of debate, but the literature suggests two distinct viewpoints. In the rst viewpoint, an agent should prefer her bundle of goods to some comparison bundle. The gold standard of fairness here is envy-freeness, which says that each agent should prefer her bundle of goods to any other agents' bundle.
In this work, we consider the second viewpoint, in which agents compare their happiness levels, or utilities. Here, an allocation is considered fair if the planner is able to make all agents equally well-o . A central fairness notion in this context is equitability: An equitable allocation is one where agents derive equal utilities from their assigned shares. Stated di erently, an equitable allocation seeks to minimize the disparity between the best-o and the worst-o agents.
Both perspectives have merit, but the practical importance of equitability as a fairness criterion has been highlighted in an experimental study conducted by Herreiner and Puppe (2009) . They asked human subjects to deliberate over an assignment of indivisible goods subject to a time limit. It was found that the chosen outcomes were equitable (and Pareto optimal) far more often than they were envy-free. They concluded that equitability is a signi cant predictor of the perceived fairness of an allocation, often more so than envy-freeness.
Like many other fairness notions, equitability has been traditionally studied for divisible goods (also called cake-cutting). In this setting, it is known that an equitable allocation always exists (Dubins and Spanier, 1961; Alon, 1987) . On the computability side, it is known that no nite procedure can nd an (exact) equitable division (Procaccia and Wang, 2017) , though an ε-equitable division can be computed in a nite number of steps (Cechlárová and Pillárová, 2012a,b) . Table 1 : Summary of results. For "Existence Results, " a denotes guaranteed existence while a indicates that existence might fail for some instance. For "Computational Results, " NP-c/ NP-h refers to NP-complete/ NP-hard. The shorthands bin, id, and pos refer to binary, identical, and strictly positive valuations, respectively.
For indivisible goods, an equitable (EQ) allocation might fail to exist even with two agents and a single good, motivating the need for approximations. To this end, Gourvès et al. (2014) proposed the notion of near jealousy-freeness, under which for any pair of agents, the disparity can be reversed by removing any good from the bundle of the agent with higher utility. We refer to this notion as equitability up to any good (EQx) in keeping with the nomenclature for a similar relaxation of envyfreeness (Caragiannis et al., 2016) . We also study equitability up to one good (EQ1), requiring only that inequity can be eliminated by removing some good from the higher-utility-agent's bundle. Gourvès et al. (2014) showed that for additive valuations, an EQx (hence, EQ1) allocation always exists and can be computed in polynomial time. However, they did not study Pareto optimality (PO), a fundamental and often desirable notion of economic e ciency that may still be violated by an (approximately) equitable allocation.
Our work takes a deeper dive into the study of (approximately) equitable allocations of indivisible goods-in conjunction with Pareto optimality as well as other well-studied notions of fairness (envyfreeness and its relaxations)-and considers a host of existence and computational questions. Table 1 provides a comprehensive summary of our results. Some of the highlights are:
• We strengthen the aforementioned result of Gourvès et al. (2014) to show that an EQx and PO allocation always exists for strictly positive valuations (Proposition 3). Without the positivity assumption, even an EQ1+PO allocation might fail to exist (Example 1), and nding an EQ+PO/EQx+PO/EQ1+PO allocation becomes strongly NP-hard (Theorem 1 and Remark 1).
• As a step towards making the above existence result constructive, we design a pseudopolynomialtime algorithm that always returns an EQ1+PO allocation for strictly positive valuations (Theorem 3).
• We construct an instance in which no allocation can be EQ1+EF1+PO (Proposition 4). 1 We show that determining whether such an allocation exists is, in general, strongly NP-hard (Corollary 1), but the special case of binary valuations is e ciently solvable (Theorem 4).
• We validate our theoretical results via experiments on the data from the popular fair division website Spliddit 2 as well as on synthetically generated instances (Section 4).
Related Work For divisible goods (i.e., cake-cutting), Dubins and Spanier (1961) showed that an equitable division always exists (without providing a bound on the number of cuts). Subsequent work has established the existence of equitable divisions where each agent gets a contiguous piece (Cechlárová et al., 2013; Aumann and Dombb, 2015; Chèze, 2017) . Equitability has also been studied in combination with other fairness and e ciency notions. It is known that there always exists a cake division that is simultaneously equitable and envy-free (Alon, 1987) . However, existence might fail if, in addition, one also requires Pareto optimality (Brams et al., 2013) or contiguous pieces (Brams et al., 2006) . Connections between Pareto optimality and social welfare maximizing equitable divisions have also been studied (Brams et al., 2012) .
For indivisible goods, in addition to the work of Gourvès et al. (2014) discussed above, Suksompong (2019) studies equitable and connected allocations of indivisible goods (i.e., when the goods constitute the vertices of a graph and a feasible allocation assigns every agent a connected subgraph).
Preliminaries
Problem instance An instance [n], [m] , V of the fair division problem is de ned by a set of n ∈ N agents [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}, a set of m ∈ N goods [m] = {1, 2, . . . , m}, and a valuation pro le V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } that speci es the preferences of every agent i ∈ [n] over each subset of the goods in [m] via a valuation function v i : 2 [m] → N ∪ {0}. 3 We will assume that the valuation functions are additive, i.e., for any agent i ∈ [n] and any set of goods S ⊆ [m], v i (S) := j∈S v i ({j}), where v i (∅) = 0. For a singleton good j ∈ [m], we will write v i,j instead of v i ({j}).
Allocation An allocation A := (A 1 , . . . , A n ) is an n-partition of the set of goods [m] , where A i ⊆ [m] is the bundle allocated to the agent i (A i is allowed to be an empty set). Given an allocation A, the utility of agent i ∈ [n] for the bundle A i is v i (A i ) = j∈A i v i,j .
Equitable allocations An allocation A is said to be equitable (EQ) if for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n], we have v i (A i ) = v k (A k ). An allocation A is equitable up to one good (EQ1) if for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n] such that A k = ∅, there exists some good j ∈ A k such that v i (A i ) ≥ v k (A k \ {j}). An allocation A is equitable up to any good (EQx) if for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n] such that A k = ∅ and for every good j ∈ A k such that v k,j > 0, we have v i (A i ) ≥ v k (A k \ {j}). 4 Envy-free allocations An allocation A is envy-free (EF) if for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n], we have v i (A i ) ≥ v i (A k ). An allocation A is envy-free up to one good (EF1) if for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n] such that A k = ∅, there exists some good j ∈ A k such that v i (A i ) ≥ v i (A k \ {j}). An allocation A is envy-free up to any good (EFx) if for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n] such that A k = ∅ and for every good j ∈ A k such that v i,j > 0, we have v i (A i ) ≥ v i (A k \ {j}). The notions of EF, EF1, and EFx are due to Foley (1967) , Budish (2011), 5 and Caragiannis et al. (2016) , respectively. Pareto optimality An allocation A is Pareto dominated by another allocation
with at least one of the inequalities being strict. A Pareto optimal (PO) allocation is one that is not Pareto dominated by any other allocation. Nash social welfare Given an instance [n], [m] , V , the Nash social welfare of an allocation A is de-
. An allocation A * is called Nash optimal or MNW (Maximum Nash Welfare) if it maximizes the Nash social welfare among all allocations. 6
3 The assumption about integrality of valuations is required only for Theorem 3. All other positive results (i.e., existence and algorithmic results) hold even in the absence of this assumption. Similarly, all negative results (i.e., non-existence and hardness results) hold even if the valuations are restricted to be integral. 4 Our results hold analogously for the following variant of EQx due to Gourvès et al. (2014) : For every pair of agents
5 Lipton et al. (2004) previously de ned a slightly weaker notion than EF1, but their algorithm can, in fact, compute an EF1 allocation.
6 Caragiannis et al. (2016) de ne a Nash optimal allocation as one that provides positive utility to the largest set of agents, and subject to that, maximizes the geometric mean of valuations. Our results hold even under this extended de nition.
Leximin-optimal allocations A Leximin-optimal allocation (Dubins and Spanier, 1961) is one that maximizes the minimum utility that any agent achieves, subject to which the second-minimum utility is maximized, and so on. The utilities induced by a Leximin-optimal allocation are unique, although there may exist more than one such allocation.
Results
This section presents our theoretical results, summarized in Table 1 . We rst consider equitability and its relaxations, then consider them in conjunction with Pareto optimality, before nally adding envy-freeness (and its relaxations) to the mix.
Existence and Computation of EQ, EQ1, EQx
We will start by observing that envy-freeness and equitability (and their corresponding relaxations) become equivalent when the valuations are identical (i.e., when, for every good
Proposition 1. For identical valuations, an allocation is EF/ EF1/ EFx if and only if it is EQ/ EQ1/ EQx.
It is known that determining whether a given instance has an envy-free (EF) allocation is NPcomplete even for identical valuations (via a straightforward reduction from P ) (Lipton et al., 2004) . 7 Proposition 1 implies that the same holds for equitable (EQ) allocations. By contrast, an EQx (and therefore EQ1) allocation always exists and can be e ciently computed (Proposition 2) even for non-identical valuations. This result is due to Gourvès et al. (2014) , who showed the existence of EQx allocations under the more general setting of matroids. et al., 2014 ). An EQx allocation always exists and can be computed in polynomial time.
Proposition 2 (Gourvès
Brie y, Gourvès et al. (2014) prove Proposition 2 using a greedy algorithm. In each round, the algorithm assigns a least-happy agent its favorite good from among the remaining goods. Thus, at any stage, the most recent good assigned to an agent is also its least-favorite good in its own bundle. Since each new good is assigned to an agent with the least utility, an allocation that is EQx prior to the assignment continues to be so after it (up to the removal of the most recently assigned good). The claim now follows by induction over the rounds.
Proposition 2 presents an interesting contrast between the notions of EQx and EFx: An EQx allocation is guaranteed to exist and can be e ciently computed, whereas for EFx, even the question of guaranteed existence is an open problem.
Equitability and Pareto Optimality
We now turn our attention to computing an allocation that is both equitable up to one good and Pareto optimal (we use the shorthand EQ1+PO for such allocations). Unfortunately, such allocations might fail to exist when the valuations are allowed to be zero-valued (Example 1). This provides an interesting contrast with the analogous relaxation of envy-freeness; it is known that an allocation satisfying EF1 and PO always exists (Caragiannis et al., 2016; Barman et al., 2018a) .
Example 1 (Non-existence of EQ1+PO). Consider an instance with three agents a 1 , a 2 , a 3 and six goods g 1 , . . . , g 6 . The goods g 1 , g 2 , g 3 are valued at 1 by a 1 and at 0 by a 2 and a 3 . The goods g 4 , g 5 , g 6 are valued at 1 by a 2 and a 3 and at 0 by a 1 . Any PO allocation must assign g 1 , g 2 , g 3 to a 1 (giving it a utility of 3) and allocate g 4 , g 5 , g 6 between a 2 and a 3 . Either a 2 or a 3 receives at most one good, creating an EQ1 violation with a 1 . Thus, an EQ1 and PO allocation might fail to exist even under binary valuations.
Worse still, when the valuations can be zero-valued, determining whether there exists an EQ1+PO allocation is strongly NP-hard. Similar hardness results hold for EQx+PO and EQ+PO allocations as well (Remark 1).
Theorem 1 (Hardness of EQ1 + PO). Given any fair division instance with additive valuations, determining whether there exists an allocation that is equitable up to one good (EQ1) and Pareto optimal (PO) is strongly NP-hard.
Proof. We will show a reduction from 3 P , which is known to be strongly NP-hard (Garey and Johnson, 1979 ). An instance of 3 P consists of a set of 3r numbers S = {b 1 , . . . , b 3r } where r ∈ N, and the goal is to nd a partition of S into r subsets S 1 , . . . , S r such that the sum of numbers in each subset is T , where T := 1 r a i ∈S b i . 8 We will construct a fair division instance as follows: There are r + 1 agents a 1 , . . . , a r+1 and 3r + 2 goods g 1 , . . . , g 3r+2 . For every i ∈ [r] and j ∈ [3r], agent a i values the good g j at b j . The agents a 1 , . . . , a r all value the goods g 3r+1 and g 3r+2 at 0. Finally, the agent a r+1 values g 3r+1 and g 3r+2 at T each, and all other goods at 0.
(⇒) Suppose S 1 , . . . , S r is a solution of 3 P . Then, an EQ1 and PO allocation A = (A 1 , . . . , A r+1 ) can be constructed as follows: For every i ∈ [r], A i := {g j : b j ∈ S i }, and A r+1 := {g 3r+1 , g 3r+2 }. Notice that A is EQ1 because each of the agents a 1 , . . . , a r has utility T , and the utility of the agent a r+1 exceeds T only by a single good g 3r+2 . Furthermore, A is PO because each good is assigned to an agent with the highest valuation for it.
(⇐) Now suppose that A = (A 1 , . . . , A r+1 ) is an EQ1 and PO allocation. Since A is PO, it must assign g 3r+1 and g 3r+2 to a r+1 . Furthermore, since A is EQ1, each of the agents a 1 , . . . , a r should have a utility of at least T under A, i.e., for every i
This induces a solution of the 3 P instance.
Remark 1 (Hardness of EQx+PO/EQ+PO). The reduction in Theorem 1 can also be used to prove strong NP-hardness of nding an EQx+PO allocation (same construction works) or an EQ+PO allocation (if a r+1 values g 3r+2 at 0).
Our next result shows that for the special case of binary valuations (i.e., for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], v i,j ∈ {0, 1}), an EQ+PO allocation, if it exists, can be computed in polynomial time. Later, we will show similar tractability results for EQ1+PO and EQx+PO allocations (Theorem 4).
Theorem 2 (Algorithm for EQ+PO for binary valuations). There is a polynomial-time algorithm that given as input any fair division instance with additive and binary valuations, returns an allocation that is equitable (EQ) and Pareto optimal (PO) whenever such an allocation exists.
Proof. We will use a maximum ow algorithm. For binary valuations, an allocation is PO if and only if it assigns each good to an agent that approves it. For an EQ allocation A, we have
, E) over the set of agents and goods with an edge (i, j) ∈ E for every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m] such that v i,j = 1. For any xed c ∈ N, construct a ow network where the source node S is connected to each agent node in [n] with an edge of capacity c. Each node corresponding to a good in [m] is connected to the sink node T with an edge of capacity 1. The edges between agents and goods are of capacity 1. It is straightforward to check that there exists an EQ+PO allocation in the fair division instance (with common utility c) if and only if the above network admits a feasible ow of value n · c. The desired algorithm simply iterates over all integral values of c between 1 and m/n .
On the other hand, when all valuations are strictly positive (i.e., v i,j > 0 for all i, j), there always exists an allocation that is both equitable up to any good and Pareto optimal.
Proposition 3 (Existence of EQx+PO for positive valuations). Given any fair division instance with additive and strictly positive valuations, an allocation that is equitable up to any good (EQx) and Pareto optimal (PO) always exists.
Proof. (Sketch.) We will show that any Leximin-optimal allocation, say A, satis es EQx (Pareto optimality is easy to verify). Suppose, for contradiction, that there exist agents i, k ∈ [n] and some good j ∈ A k such that v i (A i ) < v k (A k \ {j}). Let B be an allocation derived from A by transferring the good j from agent k to agent i. Notice that under B, both agents i and k have strictly greater utility than v i (A i ), while all other agents have exactly the same utility as under A. Thus, B is a 'Leximin improvement' over A, which contradicts that A is Leximin-optimal.
Although Proposition 3 o ers a strong existence result, it does not automatically provide a constructive procedure for nding such allocations. Indeed, computing a Leximin-optimal allocation is known to be intractable (Bezáková and Dani, 2005; Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018) . Our next result (Theorem 3) addresses this gap by providing a pseudopolynomial-time algorithm for nding an EQ1 and PO allocation when the valuations are strictly positive.
Theorem 3 (Algorithm for EQ1+PO for positive valuations). Given any fair division instance I =
[n], [m], V with additive and strictly positive valuations, an allocation that is equitable up to one good (EQ1) and Pareto optimal (PO) always exists and can be computed in O(poly(m, n, v max )) time, where
In particular, when the valuations are polynomially bounded (i.e., for every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], v i,j ≤ poly(m, n)), our algorithm runs in polynomial time. In contrast, computing a Leximin-optimal allocation remains NP-hard even under this restriction (Bezáková and Dani, 2005) .
One might expect to prove Theorem 3 via a standard relax-and-round approach: Start with a fractional maximin allocation (i.e., a fractional allocation that maximizes the minimum utility) followed by a rounding step. However, in Example 2, we provide an instance where every rounding of the fractional maximin solution fails to satisfy EQ1. Therefore, the relax-and-round approach might be inadequate for nding EQ1+PO allocations.
Our proof of Theorem 3 is deferred to Section 6.1 but a brief idea is as follows: Our algorithm (Algorithm 1) uses the framework of Fisher markets (Brainard and Scarf, 2000) , which are well-studied models of a set of buyers spending their budgets of virtual money on utility-maximizing bundles of goods. Standard welfare theorems in economics guarantee that equilibrium (i.e., market clearing) outcomes in these markets are economically e cient. However, such outcomes could, in general, lead to fractional allocations and be highly inequitable. Our algorithm addresses the rst challenge by starting with (and always maintaining) an integral equilibrium of some Fisher market. To meet the second challenge, our algorithm uses a combination of local search and price-rise routines to gradually move towards an approximately equitable equilibrium. The analysis for achieving the desired running time and correctness guarantees is intricate, and involves a number of structural observations and potential function arguments.
Our techniques are inspired from a similar recent algorithm of Barman et al. (2018a) for nding allocations that are envy-free up to one good (EF1) and Pareto optimal (PO). A key di erence between the two algorithms lies in the way a local improvement is de ned: For Barman et al. (2018a) , a local improvement is de ned in terms of equalizing the agents' spendings, whereas for us, it pertains to equalizing the agents' utilities. We believe that the latter approach is more direct, and leads to a simpler algorithm and analysis. This distinction is also necessary, because as we will show in Proposition 4, an EQ1+EF1+PO allocation might fail to exist even with strictly positive valuations. Therefore, any algorithm that is tailored to return an EF1 outcome-including the algorithm of Barman et al. (2018a) -will invariably fail to nd the desired EQ1+PO allocation, motivating the need for an alternative approach.
Given the success of market-based algorithms in nding EQ1+PO allocations, it is natural to ask whether these techniques can be extended to nd an EQx+PO allocation. Unfortunately, this is where these techniques hit a roadblock. The problem stems from the fact that the market-based algorithm always outputs a fractionally Pareto optimal (fPO) allocation (refer to Section 6.1 for the de nition), but there exist instances where no EQx allocation satis es fPO (Section 6.6). Whether an EQx+PO allocation can be computed in (pseudo-)polynomial time with strictly positive valuations is an intriguing question for future research.
Equitability, Envy-Freeness and Pareto Optimality
We will now consider all three notions-equitability, envy-freeness, and Pareto optimality-together. Recall from Proposition 3 that for strictly positive valuations, an EQ1+PO (in fact, an EQx+PO) allocation is guaranteed to exist. It is also known that an EF1+PO allocation always exists. One might therefore ask whether an EQ1+EF1+PO allocation also always exists. Our next result (Proposition 4) dismisses that possibility.
Proposition 4 (Non-existence of EQ1+EF1+PO). There exists an instance with strictly positive valuations in which no allocation is simultaneously equitable up to one good (EQ1), envy-free up to one good (EF1) and Pareto optimal (PO).
Proof. Fix some n ≥ 2 and 0 < ε < 1 2n+2 . Consider an instance with n + 1 agents a 1 , . . . , a n+1 and 3n + 1 goods g 1 , . . . , g 3n+1 . Each of a 1 , . . . , a n values each of g 1 , . . . , g n−1 at 2 and each of g n , . . . , g 3n+1 at ε. Agent a n+1 values every good at 1. By the pigeonhole principle for the goods g 1 , . . . , g n−1 , some agent among a 1 , . . . , a n must have utility at most (2n + 2)ε < 1. This means that a n+1 can be assigned at most one good (otherwise EQ1 is violated). Therefore, if all the goods are allocated (which is a necessary condition for a PO allocation), at least 3n goods must be assigned among a 1 , . . . , a n . This means that one of these agents gets at least three goods, creating an EF1 violation with a n+1 .
Remark 2. Proposition 4 has several interesting implications. First, it shows that a Nash optimal allocation-which is guaranteed to be EF1 and PO (Caragiannis et al., 2016)-need not satisfy EQ1. Similarly, the algorithm of Barman et al. (2018a) for computing an EF1 and PO allocation could also fail to return an EQ1 allocation. By contrast, our algorithm in Theorem 3 is guaranteed to nd an EQ1 and PO allocation. Finally, it shows that the Leximin-optimal allocation-which is guaranteed to be EQx and PO for strictly positive valuations (Proposition 3)-need not be EF1.
Comparison with cake-cutting It is worth comparing Proposition 4 with the corresponding results for divisible goods (i.e., cake-cutting). Brams et al. (2013) have shown that there might not exist a division of the cake that simultaneously satis es EQ, EF, and PO. Our result in Proposition 4 shows an analogous impossibility for indivisible goods. Interestingly, the impossibility for cake-cutting goes away when PO is relaxed to completeness (i.e., only requiring that the entire cake is allocated). Under this relaxation, it is known that a perfect allocation of the cake exists (Alon, 1987) . 9 By contrast, for indivisible goods, the impossibility remains even when PO is relaxed to completeness and EF1 is relaxed to proportionality up to one good (Prop1). 10 Indeed, the proof of Proposition 4 works even under these relaxations. Moreover, the proof can be easily extended to show the non-existence of EQk, Prop and complete allocations for any constants k, ∈ N.
We now turn to the computational aspects of allocations with all three properties. Note that the allocation constructed in the proof of Theorem 1 is envy-free. Therefore, from Theorem 1 and Remark 1, we obtain strong NP-hardness of all combinations of the three properties.
Corollary 1 (Hardness of EF+EQ+PO). Let X ∈ {EF, EFx, EF1}, Y ∈ {EQ, EQx, EQ1}, and Z = PO. Then, determining whether a given instance admits an allocation that is simultaneously X, Y , and Z is strongly NP-hard. 9 An allocation A is perfect if for every i, k
The intractability in Corollary 1 can, in certain cases, be alleviated when the valuations are restricted to be binary. We will start with an observation concerning EQ and PO allocations under this restriction.
Proposition 5. For binary valuations, an allocation that is equitable (EQ) and Pareto optimal (PO) is also envy-free (EF).
Proof. Suppose each agent gets a utility k under the said EQ allocation. For binary valuations, PO implies that each agent i approves all the goods in its bundle. Furthermore, any other agent j gets at most k goods approved by i (simply because agent j gets exactly k goods). Hence, the allocation is EF.
Remark 3. Proposition 5 shows that for binary valuations, an EQ+PO allocation (if it exists) is, in fact, EQ+PO+EF (hence also EQ+PO+EFx/EQ+PO+EF1). From Theorem 2, we know that there is a polynomial-time algorithm for determining whether an instance with binary valuations admits an EQ+PO allocation. A similar implication therefore also holds for EQ+PO+EF/EQ+PO+EF1/EQ+PO+EFx allocations.
Theorem 4 shows that binary valuations are also useful when one considers the combination of EQ1, EF1, and PO.
Theorem 4 (Algorithm for EQ1+EF1+PO for binary valuations). There is a polynomial-time algorithm that given as input any fair division instance with additive and binary valuations, returns an allocation that is equitable up to one good (EQ1), envy-free up to one good (EF1), and Pareto optimal (PO), whenever such an allocation exists.
The proof of Theorem 4 is provided in Section 6.7. The idea is to show that any EQ1+PO allocation, if it exists, is also Nash optimal. For binary valuations, all Nash optimal allocations induce identical utility pro les (up to renaming of agents). As a result, every Nash optimal allocation satis es EQ1. It is known that every Nash optimal allocation satis es EF1 and PO (Caragiannis et al., 2016) . Moreover, for binary valuations, a Nash optimal allocation can be computed in polynomial time (Darmann and Schauer, 2015; Barman et al., 2018b) . Therefore, determining the existence of an EQ1+EF1+PO allocation reduces to checking whether an arbitrary Nash optimal allocation satis es EQ1, which can be done in polynomial time.
Notice that for binary valuations, a Pareto optimal allocation is EF1 if and only if it is EFx, and is EQ1 if and only if it is EQx. Therefore, when the valuations are binary, the above algorithm works for all combinations of X + Y + PO, where X ∈ {EFx, EF1} and Y ∈ {EQx, EQ1}.
We conclude this section by observing that some of the problems discussed in Corollary 1 continue to be intractable even for binary valuations. This follows from a result of Bouveret and Lang (2008) , who showed that nding an envy-free (EF) and Pareto optimal (PO) allocation under binary valuations is NP-complete (refer to Proposition 21 in their paper).
Proposition 6 (Bouveret and Lang, 2008) . Given any fair division instance with additive and binary valuations, determining whether there exists an envy-free (EF) and Pareto optimal (PO) allocation is NP-complete.
Remark 4. It is easy to verify that the allocation constructed in the reduction of Bouveret and Lang (2008) is, without loss of generality, equitable up to one good (EQ1). Therefore, for binary valuations, determining whether there exists an allocation that is EF + EQ1+ PO/EF + EQx+ PO is NP-complete.
Experiments
In this section, we compare the proposed and existing algorithms (in particular, A + , MNW, and Leximin) in terms of how frequently they satisfy various fairness and e ciency properties in the real-world and synthetic datasets. For real-world preferences, we used the data obtained from the popular fair division website Spliddit (Goldman and Procaccia, 2014). Out of the 2212 instances in the Spliddit data, we used the 914 instances that had strictly positive valuations and m ≥ n. The instances have between 3 and 9 agents, and between 3 and 29 goods. 11 Users are restricted to normalized, integral valuations. For synthetic data, we generated 1000 instances with n = 5, m = 20, and (strictly positive) valuations drawn i.i.d. from Dirichlet distribution. The concentration parameter for each item is set to 10 to generate normalized valuations. 12 We consider the following combinations of fairness and e ciency properties: EQ+PO, EQ1+PO, EQx+PO, EQ1+EF1+PO, and EQx+EFx+PO. For each instance of the Spliddit and synthetic datasets, we check whether the property is satis ed by the output of A + , MNW, and Leximin. Figure 1 presents the relevant histograms. 13 Note that each of the algorithms we consider is Pareto optimal, so the histograms would be unaltered even if we did not assess PO.
Not surprisingly, we see that very few instances permit a solution that is Pareto optimal and exactly equitable. Whenever such a solution exists, it is provably achieved by Leximin, but this happens in only 1% of Spliddit instances and none of the synthetic instances. For the EQ1 relaxation, we see that not only do Leximin and A + satisfy both EQ1 and PO, but so does MNW on over 94% of Spliddit instances (and over 88% of synthetic instances). However, this trend changes when we consider EQx. A + , despite being guaranteed to satisfy EQ1, only satis es EQx on 62% of Spliddit instances (and 52% of synthetic instances). A similar drop o is observed with MNW. Thus, for the purpose of achieving (approximately) equitable and Pareto optimal allocations, Leximin is a clear winner.
We observe little change when, in addition to approximate equitability and Pareto optimality, we also require approximate envy-freeness. Indeed, in most cases, an allocation that is EQ1+PO/EQx+PO is also EF1/EFx. It is interesting to note that while MNW-which is appealing from the perspective of achieving relaxed envy-freeness-quite often fails to satisfy EQx, Leximin provably satis es relaxed equitability while also achieving EFx on a large fraction of instances.
Discussion
We studied equitable allocations of indivisible goods in conjunction with other well-known notions of fairness (envy-freeness) and economic e ciency (Pareto optimality), and provided a number of existential and computational results. In the appendix, we provide simulation results comparing the algorithms considered in Section 4 with respect to relaxations of envy-freeness (Section 6.8). We also analyze EQ1 and EQx allocations from the perspective of approximating the optimal solutions to MaxMin Fairness, otherwise known as the S C problem (Section 6.10). Our work reveals some intriguing similarities and di erences between equitability and envy-freeness. In many places, our work parallels the existing literature on envy-freeness: We present Leximin as a canonical algorithm for EQ1+PO, just like MNW achieves EF1+PO. Also, our pseudopolynomial-time algorithm for EQ1+PO uses similar techniques to that of Barman et al. (2018a) for EF1+PO. However, in other places, the di erences are more pronounced. Most notably, EQx comes with a universal existence guarantee (often in conjunction with PO), while the existence of EFx allocations remains an open problem. Finally, exact equitability is a knife-edge property often hard to achieve in practice, unlike envy-freeness which is often satis able (Dickerson et al., 2014) .
Going forward, it would be very interesting to extend our results to the public decisions model of Conitzer et al. (2017) . Extensions to models with additional feasibility constraints on the allocations (Bouveret et al., 2017) , or settings with both goods and chores (Aziz et al., 2018) will also be interesting. 
The proof of Theorem 3 relies on the algorithm A + (presented in Algorithm 1), and spans Sections 6.1 to 6.5. We will start with some necessary de nitions that will help us state Theorem 5, of which Theorem 3 is a special case. Fractional allocations A fractional allocation x ∈ [0, 1] n×m refers to a fractional assignment of the goods to the agents such that no more than one unit of any good is allocated, i.e., for every good j ∈ [m], i∈ [n] x i,j ≤ 1. We will use the term allocation to refer to a discrete allocation and explicitly write fractional allocation otherwise. ε-Pareto optimality Given any ε > 0, A is ε-Pareto optimal (ε-PO) if there does not exist an allo-
with one of the inequalities being strict. Fractional Pareto optimality An allocation is fractionally Pareto optimal (fPO) if it not Pareto dominated by any fractional allocation. Thus, a fractionally Pareto optimal allocation is also Pareto optimal, but the converse is not necessarily true (Proposition 8). ε-EQ1 allocation Given any ε > 0, an allocation A is ε-equitable up to one good (ε-EQ1) if for every pair of agents i, k
Theorem 5. Given any fair division instance with additive and strictly positive valuations and any ε > 0, an allocation that is 3ε-equitable up to one good (3ε-EQ1) and ε-Pareto optimal (ε-PO) always exists and can be computed in O(poly(m, n, ln v max , 1 /ε)) time, where v max = max i,j v i,j .
When 0 < ε ≤ 1 16mv 4 max , we recover Theorem 3 as a special case of Theorem 5 (see Lemmas 16 and 18).
The remainder of this section develops the necessary preliminaries that will enable us to present our algorithm (Algorithm 1) and the analysis of its running time (Lemma 1) and correctness (Lemma 2). The detailed proofs of these results are presented subsequently in Sections 6.2 to 6.5.
Market Preliminaries
Fisher market A Fisher market is an economic model that consists of a set of divisible goods and a set of agents (or buyers), each of whom is given a budget (or endowment) of virtual money (Brainard and Scarf, 2000) . The agents can use the virtual money to purchase a utility-maximizing subset of the goods but do not derive any utility from the money itself. Formally, a Fisher market is given by a tuple M = [n], [m], V, e consisting of a set of n agents [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}, a set of m divisible goods [m] = {1, 2, . . . , m}, a valuation pro le V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } and a vector of endowments or budgets e = (e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e n ).
A market outcome refers to a pair , V , which we will refer to as the induced fair division instance. This correspondence between Fisher markets and the fair division problem allows us to extend the fairness and e ciency notions de ned in Section 2 to Fisher markets. Thus, we will say that an allocation A is equitable/envy-free/Pareto optimal for a market M if it is equitable/envy-free/Pareto optimal for the induced fair division instance I.
MBB ratio and MBB set Given a price vector p = (p 1 , . . . , p m ), de ne the bang-per-buck ratio of agent i for good j as α i,j := v i,j /p j . 14 The maximum bang-per-buck ratio (or MBB ratio) of agent i is α i := max j α i,j . The maximum bang-per-buck set (or MBB set) of agent i is the set of all goods that maximize the bang-per-buck ratio for agent i at the price vector p, i.e., MBB i :
A market outcome (A, p) constitutes an equilibrium if it satis es the following conditions:
• Market clearing: Each good is either priced at zero or is completely allocated. That is, for every
• Budget exhaustion: Agents spend their budgets completely, i.e., s i = e i for all i ∈ [n].
• MBB consistency: Each agent's allocation is a subset of its MBB set. That is, for every agent i ∈ [n] and every good j ∈ [m], A i,j > 0 =⇒ j ∈ MBB i . Note that MBB consistency implies that every agent maximizes its utility at the given prices p under the budget constraints.
Proposition 7 presents the well-known rst welfare theorem for Fisher markets (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Chapter 16). For an MBB-allocation graph, de ne an alternating path P = (i, j 1 , i 1 , j 2 , i 2 , . . . , i −1 , j , k) from agent i to agent k (and involving the agents i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i −1 and the goods j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j ) as a series of alternating MBB and allocation edges such that
If such a path exists, we say that agent k is reachable from agent i via an alternating path. 15 In this case, the length of path P is 2 since it consists of MBB edges and allocation edges. Reachability set Let G denote the MBB-allocation graph of a Fisher market for the outcome (A, p). Fix a source agent i ∈ [n] in G. De ne the level of an agent k ∈ [n] as half the length of the shortest alternating path from i to k if one exists (i.e., if k is reachable from i), otherwise set the level of k to be n. The level of the source agent i is de ned to be 0. The reachability set R i of agent i is de ned as a level-wise collection of all agents that are reachable from i, i.e.,
, where R i denotes the set of agents that are at level with respect to agent i. Note that given an MBB-allocation graph, a reachability set can be constructed in polynomial time via breadth-rst search.
Given a reachability set R i , we can rede ne an alternating path as a set of alternating MBB and allocation edges connecting agents at a lower level to those at a higher level. Formally, we will call a path P = (i, j 1 , i 1 , j 2 , i 2 , . .
Thus, an alternating path cannot have edges between agents at the same level.
Violators and path-violators Given a Fisher market M = [n], [m], V, e and an allocation A, an agent i ∈ [n] with the least utility among all the agents is called the reference agent, i.e., i ∈ arg min k∈[n] v k (A k ). 16 An agent k ∈ [n] is said to be a violator if A k = ∅ and for every good j ∈ A k , we have that v k (A k \ {j}) > v i (A i ), where i is the reference agent. Notice that the allocation A is EQ1 if and only if there is no violator.
Given any ε > 0, an agent k ∈ [n] is an ε-violator if A k = ∅ and for every good j ∈ A k , we have v k (A k \ {j}) > (1 + ε)v i (A i ). Thus, an agent can be a violator without being an ε-violator. An allocation A is ε-EQ1 if and only if there is no ε-violator.
A closely related notion is that of a path-violator. Let i and R i denote the reference agent and its reachability set, respectively. An agent k ∈ R i is a path-violator with respect to the alternating path P = (i, j 1 , i 1 , j 2 , i 2 , . .
Note that a path-violator (along a path P ) need not be a violator as there might exist some good j ∈ A k not on the path P such that
Finally, given any ε > 0, an agent k ∈ R i is an ε-path-violator with respect to the alternating path P = (i, j 1 , i 1 
ε-rounded instance Given any ε > 0, an ε-rounded instance refers to a fair division instance
[n], [m] , V in which the valuations are either zero or a non-negative integral power of (1 + ε). That is, for every agent i ∈ [n] and every good j ∈ [m], we have v i,j ∈ {0, (1 + ε) t } for some t ∈ N ∪ {0}.
Given log 1+ε v i,j if v i,j > 0, and 0 otherwise. Notice that v i,j ≤ w i,j ≤ (1 + ε)v i,j for every agent i and every good j. We will assume that the rounded valuations are also additive, i.e., for any set of goods S ⊆ [m], w i (S) := j∈S w i,j .
Description of the Algorithm
Given an input instance I = [n], [m], V , we rst construct its ε-rounded version I = [n], [m], W , which is then provided as an input to A + (Algorithm 1). The algorithm consists of three phases. In Phase 1, each good is assigned to an agent with the highest valuation for it (Line 1). This ensures that the initial allocation is integral as well as fractionally Pareto optimal (fPO). 17 (These two properties are always maintained by the algorithm.) If the allocation at the end of Phase 1 is ε-EQ1 with respect to the rounded instance I , then the algorithm terminates and returns this allocation as the output (Line 3). Otherwise, it proceeds to Phase 2.
The allocation at the start of Phase 2 is not ε-EQ1, so there must exist an ε-violator. Starting from the level = 1 (Line 6), the algorithm now performs a level-by-level search for an ε-violator in the reachability set of the reference agent (Line 8). As soon as an ε-violator, say h, is found (along some alternating path P ), the algorithm performs a pairwise swap between h and the agent that precedes it along P (Line 9). Since the swapped good is in the MBB sets of both agents, the allocation continues to be MBB-consistent after the swap. If, at any stage, the reference agent ceases to be the least-utility agent, Phase 2 restarts with the new reference agent (Line 10).
The above process continues until either the current allocation becomes ε-EQ1 for the rounded instance I (in which case the algorithm terminates and returns the current allocation as the output in Line 13), or if no ε-violator is reachable from the reference agent (Line 7). In the latter case, the algorithm proceeds to Phase 3.
Phase 3 involves uniformly raising the prices of all the reachable goods, i.e., the set of all goods that are collectively owned by all agents that are reachable from the reference agent (Line 16). The prices are raised until a previously non-reachable agent becomes reachable due to the appearance of 16 Ties are broken lexicographically. 17 Indeed, the said allocation is MBB-consistent with respect to the prices in Line 2, and is therefore an equilibrium outcome of a Fisher market in which each agent is provided a budget equal to its spending under the allocation. From Proposition 7, the allocation is fPO. a new MBB edge (Line 14). The algorithm now switches back to Phase 2 to start a fresh search for an ε-violator in the updated reachability set (Line 17).
Comparison with the algorithm of Barman et al. (2018a) As mentioned previously in Section 3, our algorithm is inspired from the algorithm of Barman et al. (2018a) for achieving envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) together with Pareto optimality (PO). At a high-level, both algorithms involve searching for a reachable violator (along an alternating path). If such an agent exists, then it loses a good through a pairwise swap. Otherwise, both algorithms use price-rise in order to discover a new MBB edge to a previously unreachable agent. The main di erence between the two algorithms is that Barman et al. (2018a) de ne a violator in terms of excess spending, whereas we de ne a violator in terms of excess utility. 18 In other words, their algorithm performs local search in the space of spendings, whereas our algorithm does so in the space of utilities. As a result of this small but subtle di erence, Barman et al. (2018a) achieve an approximate equitability condition in terms of spendings (which they call price envy-freeness up to one good), whereas we are able to guarantee a similar property in terms of the utilities, which is precisely the desired EQ1 condition. Analysis of the algorithm The running time and correctness of our algorithm are established by Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, respectively, as stated below.
Lemma 1 (Running time). Given as input any ε-rounded instance with strictly positive valuations, A + terminates in O(poly(m, n, ln v max , 1 /ε)) time steps, where v max = max i,j v i,j .
The proof of Lemma 1 appears in Section 6.2.
Lemma 2 (Correctness). Let I be any fair division instance with strictly positive valuations and I be its ε-rounded version for any given ε > 0. Then, the allocation A returned by A + for the input I is 3ε-EQ1 and ε-PO for I. In addition, if ε ≤ 1 16mv 4 max , then A is EQ1 and PO for I.
The proof of Lemma 2 appears in Section 6.5. Notice that the running time guarantee in Lemma 1 is stated in terms of time steps. A time step refers to a single iteration of Phase 1, Phase 2, or Phase 3. Since each individual iteration requires polynomial time, it su ces to analyze the running time of the algorithm in terms of the number of iterations of the three phases. 19 We will use the terms step, time step, and iteration interchangeably.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.
Theorem 3 (Algorithm for EQ1+PO for positive valuations). Given any fair division instance I = [n], [m]
, V with additive and strictly positive valuations, an allocation that is equitable up to one good (EQ1) and Pareto optimal (PO) always exists and can be computed in O(poly(m, n, v max )) time, where v max = max i,j v i,j .
Proof. Fix ε = 1 16mv 4 max . The ε-rounded version I can be constructed in O(poly(m, n, ln v max )) time. We run the algorithm A + on the input I . From Lemma 1, we know that the algorithm terminates in O(poly(m, n, ln v max , 1 /ε)) time. Lemma 2 implies that A is EQ1 and PO for I.
Proof of Lemma 1
Recall the statement of Lemma 1. 18 Formally, in the framework of Barman et al. (2018a) , an agent k ∈ [n] is an ε-violator if for every good j ∈ A k , we have that p(A k \ {j}) > (1 + ε)p(Ai); here p(G) := g∈G pg is the sum of prices of all the goods in the bundle G, and i is the least spender.
19 Indeed, an iteration of Phase 1 involves assigning each good to the agent with the highest valuation and setting its price. An iteration of Phase 2 involves the construction of the reachability set (say via breadth-rst or depth-rst search), followed by performing a level-wise search for an ε-path-violator, followed by performing a swap operation. An iteration of Phase 3 involves scanning the set of reachable goods and setting an appropriate value of the price-rise factor ∆. All of these operations can be carried out in O(poly(m, n)) time. Proof. The proof of Lemma 1 follows immediately from Lemmas 3 and 4, which are stated below.
Lemma 3. There can be at most O(poly(m, n, 1 /ε) ln mv max ) consecutive iterations of Phase 2 before a Phase 3 step occurs.
Lemma 4. There can be at most O(poly(n, 1 /ε) ln v max ) Phase 3 steps during any execution of A + .
The proofs of Lemmas 3 and 4 are provided in Sections 6.3 and 6.4, respectively.
Proof of Lemma 3
The proof of Lemma 3 relies on several intermediate results (Lemmas 5 to 8) that are stated below.
Lemma 5. There can be at most O(poly(m, n)) consecutive swap operations in Phase 2 before either the identity of the reference agent changes or a Phase 3 step occurs.
The proof of Lemma 5 is identical to (Barman et al., 2018a, Lemma 13) and is therefore omitted. Throughout, we will use the phrase at time step t to refer to the state of the algorithm at the beginning of the time step t. In addition, we will use i t and A t := (A t 1 , . . . , A t n ) to denote the reference agent and the allocation maintained by the algorithm at the beginning of time step t, respectively. Thus, for instance, the utility of the reference agent at time step t is w it (A t it ).
Lemma 6. The utility of the reference agent cannot decrease with time. That is, for any time step t,
).
Proof. The only way in which the utility of a reference agent can change is via a swap operation in Phase 2. By construction, a reference agent can never lose a good during a swap operation (though it can possibly receive a good). Therefore, the utility of a reference agent cannot decrease.
Lemma 7. Let i be a xed agent. Consider any set of consecutive Phase 2 steps during the execution of A + . Suppose that i turns from a reference to a non-reference agent during time step t. Let t > t be the rst time step after t at which i once again becomes a reference agent. Then, either A t i is a strict subset of
Proof. In order for a reference agent to turn into a non-reference agent, it must receive a good during a swap operation. That is, agent i must receive a good at time t and hence A t i is a strict subset of A t+1 i . If agent i does not lose any good between t + 1 and t , then the claim follows. Therefore, for the rest of the proof, we will assume that agent i loses at least one good between t + 1 and t .
Among all the time steps between t + 1 and t at which agent i loses a good, let τ be the last one. Let i τ be the reference agent at time step τ . Since the utility of the reference agent is non-decreasing with time (Lemma 6), we have that
Let g denote the good lost by agent i at time step τ . An agent that loses a good must be an ε-path violator (with respect to an alternating path involving that good). Therefore,
Since i does not lose any good between τ and t , we have
Combining Equations (1) to (3) gives
as desired.
Lemma 8. There can be at most O(poly(m, n, 1 /ε) ln mv max ) changes in the identity of the reference agent before a Phase 3 step occurs.
Proof. From Lemma 7, we know that each time the algorithm cycles back to a some agent i as the reference agent, either the allocation of agent i grows strictly by at least one good, or its utility increases by at least a multiplicative factor of (1+ε). By pigeonhole principle, after every n consecutive changes in the identity of the reference agent, the algorithm must cycle back to some agent as the reference. Along with the fact that the utility of the reference agent is non-decreasing with time (Lemma 6), we get that after every mn consecutive identity changes, the utility of the reference agent must grow multiplicatively by a factor of (1 + ε). Since the utility of any agent can be at most mw max (where w max = max i,j w i,j ), there can be at most mn log 1+ε mw max changes in the identity of the reference agent during the execution of the algorithm. Furthermore, for ε-rounded valuations, we have that w max ≤ (1 + ε)v max . The stated bound now follows by observing that 1 ln(1+ε) ≤ 2 ε for every ε ∈ (0, 1).
We are now ready to prove Lemma 3.
Proof. From Lemma 8, we know that there can be at most O(poly(m, n, 1 /ε) ln mv max ) changes in the identity of the reference agent (in Phase 2) before a Phase 3 step occurs. Furthermore, Lemma 5 implies that there can be at most O(poly(m, n)) swap operations between two consecutive identity changes or an identity change and a Phase 3 step. Combining these implications gives the desired bound.
Proof of Lemma 4
The proof of Lemma 4 relies on several intermediate results (Lemmas 9 to 12 and Corollary 2) that are stated and proved below. It will be useful to de ne the set E t of all ε-violators at time step t. That is,
where i t is the reference agent at time step t. Some of our proofs will require the following assumption:
Assumption 1. At the end of Phase 1 of A + , every agent is assigned at least one good.
This assumption can be ensured via e cient preprocessing techniques similar to those used by Barman et al. (2018a) . We refer the reader to Section B.1 of their paper for details.
Lemma 9. Let t and t be two Phase 3 time steps such that t < t . Then, E t ⊆ E t .
Proof. It su ces to consider consecutive Phase 3 steps t and t such that all intermediate time steps t + 1, t + 2, . . . , t − 1 occur in Phase 2. Suppose, for contradiction, that there exists some agent k ∈ E t \ E t . Observe that a non-ε-violator cannot turn into an ε-violator in Phase 3 as the allocation of the goods remains xed during price-rise. Therefore, the only way in which k can turn into an ε-violator is via a swap operation in Phase 2. In the rest of the proof, we will argue that if there is a swap operation at time step τ (where t < τ < t ) that turns k into an ε-violator, then there is a subsequent swap operation at time step τ + 1 that turns it back into a non-ε-violator. This will provide the desired contradiction.
Suppose that agent k is at level in the reachability set when it receives a good g that turns it into an ε-violator. Recall that a swap operation involves transferring a good from an agent at a higher level + 1 to one at a lower level . Furthermore, a swap involving an agent at level + 1 happens only when no agent in the levels 1, 2, . . . , is an ε-path violator. Therefore, agent k cannot be an ε-path violator just before the time step τ . In other words, there must exist a good g on an alternating path from the reference agent i τ to agent k such that
Since agent k becomes an ε-violator (and hence an ε-path violator) after receiving the good g, we have
where the equality follows from the observation that neither the identity nor the allocation of the reference agent changes during the above swap. Note that the swap involving g does not a ect the alternating path to agent k that includes the good g . This means that agent k now becomes the only ε-path-violator at level or below. Therefore, in a subsequent swap operation at time step τ + 1, the algorithm will take g away from agent k, resulting in a new bundle A τ +1 k = A τ k ∪ {g} \ {g }. From Equation (4), we get that agent k is a non-ε-violator up to the removal of the good g, as desired.
Lemma 10. Let t and t be two Phase 3 time steps such that t < t . Then, for any k ∈ E t , A t k ⊆ A t k .
Proof. (Sketch.) Suppose, for contradiction, that there exists a good g ∈ A t k \ A t k . The only way in which agent k could have acquired the good g is via a swap operation at time step τ for some t < τ < t . Thus, agent k cannot be an ε-path-violator just before the time step τ , and therefore also cannot be an ε-violator. By an argument similar to that in the proof of Lemma 9, it follows that agent k cannot be an ε-violator at time step t , giving us the desired contradiction.
Lemma 11. For any Phase 3 time step t, E t ∩ R it = ∅.
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that there exists some k ∈ E t ∩ R it at time step t, i.e., k is an ε-violator that is reachable (via some alternating path). Then, agent k must also be an ε-path violator, implying that the algorithm continues to be in Phase 2 at time step t and therefore cannot enter Phase 3.
Lemma 12. Let t be a Phase 3 time step. Then, there exists an ε-violator k ∈ E t and a good j ∈ A t k such that for every agent i ∈ [n], β t i ≥ w i,j/w k,j , where β t i is the MBB ratio of agent i at time step t.
Proof. Note that the algorithm enters Phase 3 at time step t only if the current allocation A t is not ε-EQ1. Thus, there must exist an ε-violator agent k ∈ E t . Fix any good j ∈ A t k (this is well-de ned since A t k = ∅). From Lemmas 9 and 10, we know that k ∈ E τ and j ∈ A τ k for all Phase 3 time steps τ < t. Additionally, for every Phase 3 time step τ preceding the time step t, we know from Lemma 11 that k / ∈ R iτ . In other words, the agent k never experiences a price-rise between the start of the algorithm and the time step t. As a result, the MBB ratio of agent k at time step t is the same as that at the moment of the rst price-rise, i.e., β t k = β t 1 k , where t 1 denotes the earliest Phase 3 time step. Furthermore, since the MBB ratios of all agents remain unchanged during Phase 2, we must have that β t 1 k = 1 (this follows from the way we set the initial prices in Phase 1), and thus also β t k = 1. By a similar argument, the good j does not experience a price-rise between the start of the algorithm and the time step t. Therefore, p t j = p t 1 j . Since the allocation maintained by the algorithm is always MBBconsistent, we get that p t 1 j = w k,j . The claim now follows by noticing that each agent's MBB ratio is at least its bang-per-buck ratio for the good j.
Corollary 2. Let t be a Phase 3 time step. Then, for every agent i ∈ [n], we have β t i ≥ 1 wmax , where β t i is the MBB ratio of agent i at time step t, where w max = max i,j w i,j .
Proof. By assumption, all valuations in the original instance I are strictly positive and integral. This means that in the ε-rounded version I , for every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], we have 1 ≤ v i,j ≤ w i,j ≤ w max . Using these inequalities in the bound from Lemma 12 gives the desired claim.
We are now ready to prove Lemma 4.
Proof. The proof uses a potential function argument. For any Phase 3 time step t, we de ne a potential
where
w i,j/p t j is the MBB ratio of agent i and p t j is the price of good j at time step t. In Phase 1, the price of every good is set to be the highest valuation for that good. Along with Assumption 1, this implies that at the end of Phase 1, the MBB ratio of every agent equals 1. Since Phase 2 does not a ect the prices, the MBB ratio of every agent at the time of the earliest price-rise also equals 1. Thus, the initial value of the potential Φ 1 is 0.
We will now argue that each time the algorithm performs a price-rise, the potential must decrease by at least 1 (i.e., for any two Phase 3 steps t and t such that t < t , Φ t − Φ t ≥ 1). Recall that the algorithm never decreases the price of any good. Therefore, all bang-per-buck ratios (and hence all MBB ratios) are non-increasing with time. Thus, Φ t ≤ 0 for all time steps t ∈ {1, 2, . . . }. In addition, each time the algorithm performs a price-rise, the MBB ratio of some agent strictly decreases (because a new good gets added to the MBB set of some agent).
We will argue that the (multiplicative) drop in MBB ratio is always by a positive integral power of (1 + ε). Indeed, by assumption, all valuations are integral powers of (1 + ε). We already observed earlier that all MBB ratios at the end of Phase 1 are equal to 1, which means that all initial prices must also be integral powers of (1 + ε). Furthermore, the price-rise factor ∆ is a ratio of bang-per-buck ratios, and is therefore also an integral power of (1 + ε). So, whenever the MBB ratio of some agent strictly decreases, it must be by an integral power of (1 + ε). This means that after every price-rise in Phase 3, the potential must decrease by at least 1.
All that remains to be shown is a lower bound on the potential Φ t . From Corollary 2, we know that for every Phase 3 time step t, we have β t i ≥ 1 wmax , and consequently, Φ t ≥ −n log 1+ε w max . Since the potential decreases by at least 1 between any consecutive price-rises, the overall number of Phase 3 time steps can be at most n log 1+ε w max . For ε-rounded valuations, we have w max ≤ (1 + ε)v max , and therefore n log 1+ε w max = n + n log 1+ε v max . The stated bound now follows by observing that 1 ln(1+ε) ≤ 2 ε for every ε ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Lemma 2
The proof of Lemma 2 relies on several intermediate results (Lemmas 13, 14 and 16 to 18) as stated below.
Lemma 13. Given as input any ε-rounded instance I with strictly positive valuations, the allocation A returned by A + is ε-EQ1 and fPO for I .
Proof. From Lemma 1, we know that A + is guaranteed to terminate. Furthermore, the algorithm can only terminate in Lines 3 or 13. In both cases, the allocation A returned by the algorithm is guaranteed to be ε-EQ1 with respect to the input instance I .
To see why A is fPO, note that A + always maintains an MBB-consistent allocation (with respect to the current prices). De ne a Fisher market where each agent is assigned a budget equal to its spending under A. Then, the outcome (A, p) satis es the equilibrium conditions for this market. Therefore, from Proposition 7, A is fPO.
Lemma 14. Let I be any fair division instance and I be its ε-rounded version for any given ε > 0. Then, an allocation A that is fPO for I is ε-PO for I.
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that A is ε-Pareto dominated in I by an allocation B, i.e.,
. Since I is an ε-rounded version of I, we have that v i,j ≤ w i,j ≤ (1 + ε)v i,j for every agent i and every good j. Using this bound and the additivity of valuations, we get that
. Thus, B Pareto dominates A in the instance I , which is a contradiction since A is fPO (hence PO) for I . Proof. Recall that the prices can change only during Phase 3. From Corollary 2, we know that before the start of any Phase 3 time step t, we have β t i ≥ 1 wmax for every i ∈ [n]. Furthermore, at any time step t, each good j is assigned to an agent i such that j ∈ MBB i . Therefore, for every good j ∈ A i , we have p t j = w i,j β t i ≤ w 2 max , where p t j denotes the price of good j at time step t. In particular, if t 1 , . . . , t N denote the Phase 3 time steps during the execution of the algorithm, then just before the nal price-rise at t N , we have that p
Let ∆ N denote the (multiplicative) price-rise factor at time step t N . By de nition,
for every agent h ∈ R i and every good j ∈ [m] \ A R i ; here, β t N h is the MBB ratio of agent h at time step t N and A R i := ∪ h∈R i A h is the set of reachable goods. Since the MBB ratios are non-increasing with time, we have that β t N h ≤ 1 for all agents h ∈ [n]. Additionally, since all valuations in the original instance I are strictly positive integers and I is its ε-rounded version, we have that w i,j ≥ v i,j ≥ 1. The above observations give us that ∆ N ≤ p t N j . The nal price of every good is, therefore, at most
Lemma 16. Let I be any fair division instance and I be its ε-rounded version for any 0 < ε ≤ 1 16mv 4 max . Let A be the allocation returned by A + for the input instance I . Then, A is PO for I.
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that the allocation A is Pareto dominated by an allocation B in the instance I. That is,
Let p denote the price-vector right after the termination of A + . Let α k and β k denote the MBB ratios (with respect to p) of agent k ∈ [n] in I and I , respectively. Since I is an ε-rounded version of I, we have v k,j ≤ w k,j ≤ (1 + ε)v k,j for every agent k ∈ [n] and every good j ∈ [m]. Thus,
(A is MBB-consistent in I ).
Now consider the allocation B. By de nition of MBB ratio, we have that
Along with Equation (5), this gives
By a similar reasoning for agent i, we get
The combined spending over all the goods is given by
(from Equations (6) and (7)
(since all the goods are allocated under A).
Further simpli cation gives
where the rst inequality follows from simplifying the preceding relation, the second inequality follows from ε > 0, and the third inequality uses the fact that α i ≤ 1 for every agent i. . Using this bound in the above expression for ε while keeping the (1 + ε) term intact, we get that (1 + ε) 4 > 16, or, equivalently, ε > 1, which is a contradiction. Hence, A must be PO for I.
Lemma 17. Let I be any fair division instance and I be its ε-rounded version for any given ε > 0. Then, an allocation A that is ε-EQ1 for I is 3ε-EQ1 for I.
Proof. Since A is ε-EQ1 for I , we have that for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n] such that A k = ∅, there exists a good j ∈ A k such that (1 + ε)w i (A i ) ≥ w k (A k \ {j}). Furthermore, since I is an ε-rounded version of I, we have that v i,j ≤ w i,j ≤ (1 + ε)v i,j for every agent i and every good j. Using this relation along with the additivity of valuations (in I ), we get that for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n], there exists a good j ∈ A k such that
Lemma 18. Given any fair division instance I and any 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1 6mvmax , an allocation A is 3ε-EQ1 for I if and only if it is EQ1 for I.
Proof. Since A is 3ε-EQ1, we have that for every pair of agents i, k
Since the valuations are integral, this implies that there exists a good j ∈ A k such that v k (A k \ {j}) − v i (A i ) ≤ 0, which is the EQ1 condition.
We are now ready to prove Lemma 2.
Proof. The allocation A returned by A + is guaranteed to be ε-EQ1 and fPO with respect to the input instance I (Lemma 13). Lemmas 14 and 17 together imply that A is 3ε-EQ1 and ε-PO for I. Furthermore, if ε ≤ 1 16mv 4 max , then the bounds in Lemmas 16 and 18 are satis ed, which implies that A is EQ1 and PO for I.
EQx+fPO might fail to exist
Proposition 8 (Non-existence of EQx+fPO). Given any ε > 0, there exists an ε-rounded instance with strictly positive valuations in which no allocation is simultaneously equitable up to any good (EQx) and fractionally Pareto optimal (fPO).
Proof. Consider the following instance with two agents and three goods: 20 The reason we have αi ≤ 1 is because all the MBB ratios (for I ) are initially equal to 1 (this is discussed in the proof of Lemma 4). Since the algorithm never decreases the price of any good, the nal MBB ratios are all at most 1, i.e., βi ≤ 1 for all i ∈ [n]. Since αi ≤ βi, the relation follows.
Observe that all valuations are non-negative integral powers of (1 + ε), and therefore satisfy the ε-rounded property. This instance has two EQx allocations A and B given by A 1 = {g 2 }, A 2 = {g 1 , g 3 } and B 1 = {g 1 , g 3 }, B 2 = {g 2 }. The utilities of the agents under A are v 1 (A 1 ) = (1 + ε) 10 and v 2 (A 2 ) = 2 + ε, and under B are v 1 (B 1 ) = 2 + ε and v 2 (B 2 ) = (1 + ε) 10 . Now consider a fractional allocation x given by the following assignment matrix:
The utilities of the agents under x are v 1 (x 1 ) = (1 + ε) 10 and v 2 (x 2 ) = 2 + 2ε, implying that x Pareto dominates A. For a similar reason, the fractional allocation y given by
Pareto dominates the allocation B. Hence, the above instance has no EQx and fPO allocation. Note that the above instance does admit an EQx and PO allocation (Proposition 3) as both A and B satisfy these two properties.
Remark 5. The instance in Proposition 8 also rules the existence of an EFx and fPO allocation.
Proof of Theorem 4
The proof of Theorem 4 relies on a series of intermediate results (Lemmas 19 to 22) that are presented below. We will start with a simple observation concerning directed graphs. It will be convenient to de ne, for any given directed graph G = (V, E), the sets E + := {v ∈ V : outdeg G (v) > indeg G (v)} and E − := {v ∈ V : indeg G (v) > outdeg G (v)}, where indeg G (v) and outdeg G (v) denote the indegree and outdegree of a vertex v, respectively.
Lemma 19 (Edge-decomposition lemma). Let G = (V, E) be a directed graph. Then, the set of edges E can be partitioned into a set of directed paths P = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . } and a set of directed cycles C = {C 1 , C 2 , . . . } such that each path in P starts at a vertex in E + and ends at a vertex in E − .
Proof. Consider a directed graph H = (V H , E H ) derived from the graph G as follows: For every vertex i ∈ V of the graph G, create ∆ := max{indeg G (i), outdeg G (i)} copies of i, say i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i ∆ . The vertex set V H of the graph H is the union of all such copies of all the vertices in V . The set of edges E H is de ned as follows: For every vertex i ∈ V , x an arbitrary one-to-one correspondence between the incoming (respectively, outgoing) edges of i in G and the set i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i indeg G (i) (respectively, the set i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i outdeg G (i) ). For every edge (i, k) ∈ E, we add an edge between the corresponding copies of i and k. This completes the construction of the graph H.
Notice that each vertex in H has at most one incoming edge and at most one outgoing edge. Therefore, the set of edges E H can be partitioned into a set of directed paths P = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . } and a set of directed cycles C = {C 1 , C 2 , . . . } that are vertex-disjoint (in H). Since the edges in H are in a one-toone correspondence with the edges in G, the sets P and C also constitute a partition of the edges in G (not necessarily vertex-disjoint in G).
Finally, notice that each path P ∈ P in H must start at a vertex i ∈ V H with outdeg H (i) = 1 and indeg H (i) = 0, and must end at a vertex k ∈ V H with outdeg H (k) = 0 and indeg H (k) = 1. By construction, a vertex in H has outdegree 1 and indegree 0 if and only if it is a copy of a vertex in the set E + in G. Similarly, a vertex in H with outdegree 0 and indegree 1 is a copy of a vertex in the set E − . Therefore, any path in P, when projected to the graph G, must start at a vertex in E + and end at a vertex in E − , as desired.
Given a starting allocation A and a target allocation B, de ne a directed graph G = (V, E) over the set of agents (i.e., V = [n]) as follows: For every good g ∈ A i ∩ B k , add an edge directed from vertex i to vertex k. We call G the transformation graph from A to B. Notice that a directed path in G denotes a chain of pairwise swaps of goods. Similarly, a cycle in G denotes a cyclic exchange of goods. Also notice that G has at most m edges. 21 From Lemma 19, we know that E can be partitioned into a set of directed paths P = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . } and a set of directed cycles C = {C 1 , C 2 , . . . } such that each path starts at a vertex in E + and ends at a vertex in E − , where
For binary valuations, an allocation is Pareto optimal if and only if each good is assigned to an agent that approves it. Therefore, if A and B are Pareto optimal and the valuations are binary, we also have that
We formalize this observation in Corollary 3.
Corollary 3. Let A and B be two Pareto optimal allocations for a given fair division instance with binary valuations, and let G = (V, E) be the transformation graph from A to B. Then, the set of edges E can be partitioned into a set of at most m directed paths P = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . } and a set of directed cycles C = {C 1 , C 2 , . . . } such that each path starts at a vertex in E + and ends at a vertex in E − , where
Corollary 3 will be useful in proving Lemmas 20 and 21.
Lemma 20. Let I be a fair division instance with binary valuations. If there exists an allocation A that is EQ1 and PO for I, then A must also be Nash optimal.
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that A is EQ1 and PO but not Nash optimal, and let B be some Nash optimal allocation. Let G = (V, E) be the transformation graph from A to B, and let
Since both A and B are PO, we can apply Corollary 3 to obtain a partition of the set of edges E into a set of at most m directed paths P = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . } and a set of directed cycles C = {C 1 , C 2 , . . . } such that each path starts at an agent in E + and ends at an agent in E − . Notice that P = ∅, since each cyclic exchange in C amounts to no change in Nash social welfare.
Let A 1 := A and A i+1 := P i (A i ), where P 1 , P 2 , . . . are the paths in P, and P i (A i ) is the allocation obtained by performing the pairwise swaps along the path P i starting from A i . Then, the quantity NSW(B) − NSW(A) can be written as the following telescoping sum:
Since A is not Nash optimal, we have that NSW(B) > NSW(A). Therefore, there must exist some path P i ∈ P such that NSW(A i+1 ) > NSW(A i ), where A i+1 = P i (A i ). Say P i starts at an agent s ∈ E + and ends at an agent t ∈ E − . Notice that the utility of every agent other than s and t remains unchanged between A i and A i+1 . Therefore, the inequality NSW(
Since the valuations are binary, we have v s (A i+1 s ) = v s (A i s ) − 1 and v t (A i+1 t ) = v t (A i t ) + 1. Substituting these relations in the above inequality gives v s (A i s ) > v t (A i t ) + 1. Notice that while performing pairwise swaps according to the paths in P, the utility of the agents in E + can never increase (and that of the agents in E − can never decrease).
. We therefore get v s (A s ) > v t (A t ) + 1, which contradicts that A is EQ1. Hence, A must be Nash optimal. From Lemma 20, we know that B is Nash optimal. Then, by Lemma 21, B and A must have equivalent utility pro les, i.e., there exists a permutation σ :
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.
Proof. It is known that for binary valuations, a Nash optimal allocation can be computed in polynomial time (Darmann and Schauer, 2015; Barman et al., 2018b) . If this allocation satis es EQ1, then we have the desired allocation (since a Nash optimal allocation is also EF1+PO; Caragiannis et al. 2016). Otherwise, using the contrapositive of Lemma 22, we know that no allocation satis es EQ1 and PO.
Experimental Results for Envy-Freeness
In this section we discuss additional experimental results that pertain only to (relaxations of) envyfreeness, not equitability. Figure 2 presents histograms of the same form as Figure 1 for the following combinations of properties: EF+PO, EF1+PO, and EFx+PO.
We begin by noting that all algorithms satisfy EF1+PO on all synthetic instances and almost all Spliddit instances. Of the 914 Spliddit instances, Leximin satis es EF1+PO on 913 and A + on 912 of them (MNW is theoretically guaranteed to always satisfy EF1+PO).
Interestingly, despite being guaranteed to satisfy EF1, MNW is actually outperformed by Leximin with respect to both EF and EFx. Leximin satis es EF on 55% of Spliddit instances and 98% of synthetic instances, whereas MNW satis es EF on only 46% of Spliddit instances and 90% of synthetic instances. A + performs the worst from the perspective of envy, which is not surprising given that it is speci cally designed with equitability (up to one good) in mind. All algorithms perform better with respect to the relaxed property EFx, but the relative performance of the algorithms is preserved, with Leximin satisfying EFx on strictly more instances than MNW, which in turn performs better than A + . In contrast to the equitability-related properties investigated in Section 4, all algorithms achieve envy-related properties more frequently on synthetic instances than on Spliddit instances. We speculate that this is due to greater correlation between agents' valuations for Spliddit data than in our Dirichlet model, making Spliddit instances 'harder' from the perspective of removing envy.
Miscellaneous Examples
Example 2. This example presents an instance where every rounding of the fractional maximin allocation (i.e., a fractional allocation that maximizes the minimum utility) violates EQ1. Consider the following instance with three agents a 1 , a 2 , a 3 and their (additive) valuations over three goods g 1 , g 2 , g 3 as below: g 1 g 2 g 3 a 1 1 /4 − ε /2 1 /4 − ε /2 1 /2 + ε a 2 ε ε 1 − 2ε a 3 ε ε 1 − 2ε
The fractional maximin allocation assigns g 1 and g 2 to a 1 , and splits g 3 equally between a 2 and a 3 . In any rounding of this allocation, either a 2 or a 3 will get an empty bundle, thus creating an EQ1 violation with a 1 .
We remark that the above example also shows that any rounding of the fractional MNW allocation (i.e., a fractional allocation that maximizes the geometric mean of the utilities) violates EF1. A similar implication was previously shown by Caragiannis et al. (2016) by means of a more complicated example involving 3 agents and 31 goods.
Example 3. This example shows that allocations other than a Leximin-optimal can satisfy EQ1 and PO. Suppose there are three goods {g 1 , g 2 , g 3 } and two agents {1, 2} with identical valuations given by v g 1 = 2 and v g 2 = v g 3 = 1. The allocation A = (A 1 , A 2 ) with A 1 = {g 1 , g 2 } and A 2 = {g 3 } satis es EQ1 and PO, but is not Leximin-optimal.
Example 4. This example shows that when we allow the valuations to be zero-valued, a Leximinoptimal allocation need not be EQ1, even when there exists another allocation that is EQ1 and PO. Consider the following instance with three agents and eight goods: g 1 g 2 , g 3 g 4 , g 5 , g 6 , g 7 , g 8 a 1 7 (0, 0) (0, 0, 0, 0, 0) a 2 0 (5, 5) (2, 2, 2, 2, 2) a 3 0 (5, 5) (2, 2, 2, 2, 2)
The above instance has exactly two Leximin-optimal allocations, {g 1 }, {g 2 , g 3 }, {g 4 , . . . , g 8 } and {g 1 }, {g 4 , . . . , g 8 }, {g 2 , g 3 }, both of which violate EQ1. Yet, there exists an EQ1 and PO allocation {g 1 }, {g 2 , g 4 , g 5 }, {g 3 , g 6 , g 7 , g 8 }. Note that PO follows from the fact that g 1 is uniquely valued by agent 1, and that g 2 , . . . , g 8 constitute a sub-instance with identical valuations for the agents a 2 and a 3 .
Approximating Max-Min Fairness
We now ask whether our (approximate) notions of equitability, in conjunction with Pareto optimality, provide any approximation guarantee for the S C problem (Bezáková and Dani, 2005; Bansal and Sviridenko, 2006) . Intuitively, both (approximate) equitability and S C have egalitarian goals: The former aims to minimize the disparity between the best-o and worst-o individuals, while the latter aims to maximize the utility of the worst-o agent. It is therefore pertinent to ask whether and how well do the solutions of one problem work for the other.
Formally, an instance of S C consists of a fair division instance (with additive valuations) and some r ∈ R, and asks whether it is possible to allocate the goods so that every agent has utility at least r. For a given instance, denote by OPT the highest value of r for which the S C instance has a solution. For any b ∈ [0, 1], we say that an allocation A is a b-approximation if v i (A i ) ≥ b · OPT for all i ∈ [n]. It is known that computing a b-approximation for S C for any xed b > 1 2 is strongly NP-hard (Bezáková and Dani, 2005) .
We rst observe that an (arbitrary) allocation satisfying EQx and PO might fail to provide any non-trivial approximation to S C .
Example 5. Consider an instance with two agents a 1 , a 2 and two goods g 1 , g 2 , with v 1,1 = K, v 1,2 = K − 1, v 2,1 = K − 1, and v 2,2 = 1, for some positive K. The allocation A = (A 1 , A 2 ) given by A 1 = {g 1 } and A 2 = {g 2 } is EQx and PO. Under A, agent a 2 has a utility of 1, whereas it is possible for the agents to swap bundles and receive a utility of OPT = K − 1 each. The approximation ratio of 1 K−1 can be made arbitrarily small for a suitably large K. We can, however, guarantee a non-trivial approximation by imposing additional structure on the EQx+PO solution. In particular, Theorem 6 achieves a better approximation factor that depends on the number of goods allocated to the agent with highest utility.
Theorem 6 (S C Approximation for EQx and PO Allocations). Any allocation that satis es EQx+PO and allocates c goods to an agent with highest utility provides a (1 − 1/c)-approximation to the S C problem. Furthermore, this bound is tight.
Proof. We will start by showing the approximation guarantee. Let A be any EQx+PO allocation that assigns c goods to an agent with the highest utility, say i (thus, i ∈ arg max k∈[n] v k (A k ) and |A i | = c).
Then, we must have that v i (A i ) ≥ OPT, otherwise there exists an allocation B for which
, which violates PO. Let j ∈ A i be the least positively valued good of agent i in its bundle, i.e., j ∈ arg min ∈A i :v i, >0 v i, . Then, v i,j ≤ (1/c) · v i (A i ). The desired approximation now follows by invoking the EQx condition: For any agent k ∈ [n],
We will now show that the above bound is tight. Consider the instance in Example 5, with two additional copies of good g 1 ; thus four goods overall. With slight abuse of notation, we will write {g 1 , g 2 , g 1 , g 1 } to denote the set of goods. Notice that the allocation A = (A 1 , A 2 ) given by A 1 = {g 1 , g 1 } and A 2 = {g 1 , g 2 } is EQx, PO, and assigns c = 2 goods to the highest utility agent. From the above analysis, A achieves (at least) 1 2 -approximation to S C . Furthermore, under A, agent a 2 receives a utility of K. However, the allocation B = (B 1 , B 2 ) with B 1 = {g 1 , g 2 } and B 2 = {g 1 , g 1 } shows that OPT ≥ 2K − 2. For a suitably large K, the approximation ratio of K 2K−2 achieved by A can be made arbitrarily close to 1 2 .
Remark 6. As an application of Theorem 6, suppose that all valuations v i,j lie in the range [1, c] , and m > c 2 n. The average utility is at least c 2 , which means that the agent with the highest utility must receive at least c goods (since each good is valued at no more than c). In this setting, any allocation that satis es EQx and PO therefore achieves a (1 − 1 c )-approximation to OPT. For identical valuations, we can give a tight bound on the approximation guarantee of an EQ1 allocation.
Theorem 7 (S C Approximation for EQ1 Allocations and Identical Valuations). For identical valuations, any allocation satisfying EQ1 provides a 1 n -approximation to the S C problem. Furthermore, this bound is tight.
Proof. Denote the common valuation function by v. We will rst prove that no EQ1 allocation can do better than 1 n . Consider an instance with n agents and m = 2n − 1 goods. For every good j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, v j = 1, and for every good j ∈ {n + 1, . . . , 2n − 1}, v j = n. De ne an allocation A with A i = {i, n + i} for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, and A n = {n}. Observe that A is EQ1. Also, agent n has a utility of only 1, even though it is possible to give every agent a utility of n.
We next prove the approximation guarantee. Suppose that allocation A satis es EQ1, and let i be an agent with lowest utility under A. Then, for any k = i such that A k = ∅, there exists a good
Consider the alternative allocation B with B k = {g k } for all k = i, and B i = [m] \ ∪ k =i {g k }. Note that v(B i ) cannot be less than OPT: If it were, then there would exist another allocation C with v(C k ) > v(B i ) for all agents k. But this is impossible, because there are at most n − 1 goods with v j > v(B i )-namely, each of the g k goods-and the value of all other goods only sums to v(B i ).
Combining these facts, we get that
where the inequality follows from Equation (8 
